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REMARKS
THE JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS:
HOW BROKEN IS IT?
The Honorable Stephanie K. Seymour*
I chose this topic, the judicial appointment process, because of the
significance of the issue to our constitutional form of government. The
Constitution creates three branches of government-the executive, the legislative,
and the judiciary-and mandates that the president appoint members of the
judiciary with the Senate's advice and consent. The history of judicial
appointments makes clear that the process has always been political, and the
reason for political battles over appointments is patent. The significance of the
president's power of appointment cannot be overstated. The more than 800
positions on the federal bench, each bestowing life tenure, present the president
with an opportunity to create a legacy that far outlasts his or her time in office.1
The magnitude of this power has long been understood in the context of Supreme
Court appointments, but recently we have begun to see greater recognition of the
impact of district and circuit court appointments as well.' Some argue this
heightened attention is deserved because increasingly restrictive rules of certiorari
in the Supreme Court have rendered the courts of appeals "the courts of last
resort in ninety-nine percent of the cases that come before them."3
I have no quarrel with the political nature of the appointment process. In
my judgment, what is broken about the process is the increasing tendency of the
Senate to unduly delay individual appointments, particularly to the courts of
appeals. This delay impacts the ability of the judiciary to fulfill its responsibility to
* Judge, Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; appointed 1979 by President Jimmy Carter. This
address was presented February 19, 2004, at the University of Tulsa College of Law as the
Distinguished Judge in Residence. I gratefully acknowledge the invaluable assistance I have received
from my law clerk, Anne Harden, in the preparation of this lecture.
1. See John Anthony Maltese, Confirmation Gridlock: The Federal Judicial Appointments Process
under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 5 J. App. Prac. & Process 1, 27 (2003) (noting the number of
lifetime judicial positions subject to presidential appointment and commenting on their import).
2. See William G. Ross, The Role of Judicial Issues in Presidential Campaigns, 42 Santa Clara L.
Rev. 391, 482 (2002) (stating that while the Supreme Court receives the lion's share of public attention,
district and circuit court appointments are gaining in importance among voters).
3. Maltese, supra n. 1, at 27; see Ross, supra n. 2, at 469.
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provide expeditious judicial review. I will first describe some of the history of the
selection of federal judges to underscore that the current contentiousness between
the president and the minority party in the Senate is merely politics as usual, albeit
on an escalated scale. Then I will address the increasing slowdown in the
appointment process and the direct impact it has on the business of the courts, and
therefore on the public.
I. POLITICS As USUAL
Article II of the Constitution dictates that the president "shall nominate, and
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint"4 members of the
federal judiciary. The division of the powers of nomination and confirmation
reflects the founders' deep concern over the concentration of power. James
Madison famously cautioned, "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.,
5
The Senate's advice and consent was thus presented as a check on the tremendous
6
appointment power placed in the executive. As Alexander Hamilton made clear
in The Federalist Papers, it was also meant to promote transparency and
responsibility in the appointment process:
[A]s there would be a necessity for submitting each nomination to the judgment of
an entire branch of the legislature, the circumstances attending an appointment,
from the mode of conducting it, would naturally become matters of notoriety; and
the public would be at no loss to determine what part had been performed by the
different actors. The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the President
singly and absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the
door of the Senate; aggravated by the consideration of their having counteracted the
good intentions of the Executive.7
By constitutional design, therefore, the appointment process is one of public
political wrangling between the branches. The current state of affairs is thus
neither unexpected nor, perhaps, even unintended.s
Ideological debates over nominations have been around since the nation's
founding. The importance of a nominee's judicial philosophy was not lost on the
first Senate, which used the tools of advice and consent as a check on executive
power. "In exercising this check, senators generally viewed their core
responsibility as determining the fitness of a judicial nominee, and they generally
4. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
5. James Madison, The Federalist No. 51, in The Federalist 342, 344 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
Henry Holt & Co. 1898).
6. See Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 76, in The Federalist 505, 508-09 (Paul Leicester
Ford ed., Henry Holt & Co. 1898) (noting that the cooperation of the Senate "would be an excellent
check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment
of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a
view to popularity").
7. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 77, in The Federalist 511, 513-14 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., Henry Holt & Co. 1898).
8. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Federal Judicial Selection as War, Part Three: The Role of Ideology, 15
Regent U. L. Rev. 15, 17 (2002-2003) (arguing that criticism of political tension between branches is
unfounded, as the Constitution "pits presidents and senators against each other").
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considered ideology as central to their evaluations of a-judicial nominee's fitness."9
The Senate's first "political" rejection of a president's judicial nomination took
place in 1795 when it refused to confirm President Washington's selection of the
eminently qualified former Associate Justice John Rutledge as Chief Justice
because many senators disagreed with his position on this country's treaty with
England. °
Despite placement of the appointment power primarily in the hands of the
executive, "the founders conceived of a major role for the Senate in the selection
process."'" The Senate was expected to give advice as well as consent, and it has
revolted when the president failed to consult individual senators before selecting a
nominee from their respective states. When President Washington sought to fill a
position in Savannah without first conferring with Georgia's Senate delegation,
the entire Senate balked and refused to accept the President's selection,
effectively forcing the President to withdraw his nomination. 2 This turn of events
provides insight into early expectations in the appointment process.
To the President, the [Georgia] senators signaled an intention to regard pre-
nomination consultation as a norm of the confirmation process. The other senators
signaled to their Georgia colleagues that they could be counted on to support them
in their decision, and, consequently, that they would be worthy of similar support in
the future. The president, on the other hand, by withdrawing the nomination,
clearly signaled to the whole Senate that he recognized the validity of the advice
norm, and would abide by it."
The identification of candidates for judicial office and eventual selection of
nominees is a delicate political process. Presidents have historically placed
primary control over the selection process in a single member of the
administration. President Washington entrusted his secretary of state with
selection, and subsequent presidents followed suit until President Pierce
transferred authority to his attorney general in 1853, 4 where it remained until
recent times, when the president began using advisors in the White House to assist
in the process.
Several presidents added innovations. For example, President Eisenhower
invited the American Bar Association (ABA) to play a formal role in the
process, 5 which continued until President George W. Bush took office, 6 and
9. Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal Appointments Process, 50
Duke L.J. 1687, 1705 (2001); see Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36
U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 619, 624-25 (2003); Maltese, supra n. 1, at 10.
10. Chemerinsky, supra n. 9, at 625; see Maltese, supra n. 1, at 10.
11. Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from Roosevelt through
Reagan 6 (Yale U. Press 1997).
12. Brannon P. Denning, The "Blue Slip": Enforcing the Norms of the Judicial Confirmation
Process, 10 Win. & Mary Bill Rights J. 75, 92-93 (2001).
13. Id. at 93 (footnote omitted).
14. Goldman, supra n. 11, at 6.
15. Id. at 115.
16. See Gerhardt, supra n. 8, at 25. The current administration removed the ABA from its
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President Carter employed merit selection commissions for circuit judgeships."
Each president identifies which members of his administration will participate,
and those officials seek senatorial recommendations, particularly from senators
representing states where vacancies exist. Governors, members of Congress, and
party loyalists suggest candidates from time to time. Administration officials
perform an initial screening and then send surviving candidates a questionnaire.
The Justice Department and the ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary
receive copies of completed questionnaires, and the ABA rates the candidate.
FBI screening follows. Then the attorney general sends the nomination to the
president, and if he approves, the nomination proceeds to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, and ultimately to the Senate floor."
The nominees that have emerged reveal the persistent import of politics and
patronage in the selection process. Pre sidents Washington and John Adams
appointed Federalists like themselves.' 9 Nominations became particularly "party-
dominated" under Presidents Jackson and Van Buren, and party loyalty prevailed
in the selection process through the Tyler, Polk, Taylor, and Fillmore
presidencies.2 0 All presidents principally have nominated members of their own
party, and President Eisenhower even had all of his nominees cleared by the
Republican National Committee.21
The first president to recognize the significance of appointments in
22furthering a policy agenda may have been President Lincoln. By 1896, that
awareness had grown, and the Democratic platform laid blame for the national
23deficit on the Supreme Court's decision striking down the income tax.
Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson, and Coolidge were also cognizant of
24the role of the courts in promoting their policy goals, and President Franklin
Roosevelt saw appointment of judges with ideologies similar to his own as
essential to the success of the New Deal.2 5 The political landscape of the 1930s
provides particular insight into the interplay of judicial appointments and
presidential policy. Over a third of federal district and circuit courts issued close
to 1,600 injunctions in 1935 and 1936, preventing enforcement of President
Roosevelt's New Deal legislation.26 At the time, approximately three-fourths of
the federal judiciary was Republican. 7 Putting it plainly, Judge William Denman
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote to President Roosevelt in 1936,
17. Goldman, supra n. 11, at 238.
18. Id. at 9-11.
19. Id. at 7.
20. See id. at 7-8.
21. Id. at 113.
22. See Goldman, supra n. 11, at 8.
23. Ross, supra n. 2, at 398.
24. Goldman, supra n. 11, at 9; see Ross, supra n. 2, at 399-412.
25. See Goldman, supra n. 11, at 19-20.
26. Id. at 30-31.
27. Id. at 31.
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stating, "The New Deal needs more Federal judges., 28  Over President
Roosevelt's twelve years in office, he succeeded in appointing numerous federal
judges sympathetic to the New Deal.29
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson sought to ensure that civil rights gains in
the legislative arena would not be undermined in the courts.3 ° In the Kennedy
administration, "[i]t was the determined policy not to appoint segregationists to
the Fourth and Fifth circuits,' which at the time were the circuits covering most
of the southern states. On all courts, an anti-segregationist stance could save an
32otherwise right-leaning nominee. In the 1964 election, Barry Goldwater used
President Johnson's support of controversial Supreme Court decisions as a
conservative rallying cry, and his views were echoed in conservative quarters such
as the Wall Street Journal editorial page.33 As President Johnson saw his
popularity plummet in the quagmire of Vietnam, however, raw politics overtook
commitment to racial equality; the White House wrested central command of
appointments from the attorney general's office, and "loyalty" to the president
34
arguably became the chief attribute sought in nominees.
According to one scholar on the subject, "[j]udicial issues may have
influenced the outcome of the 1968 election more than any other election in the
nation's history., 35 In a presidential race with Hubert Humphrey, Richard Nixon
ran a campaign against a "liberal" federal judiciary and promised to restore
"conservative law and order 36 through his power of appointment.37  In office,
President Nixon expressed support for a potential constitutional amendment
38requiring reconfirmation of all federal judges after a ten-year term.
"Undoubtedly, this was tied to policy concerns.,
39
These presidential policy agendas have had to compete with senatorial
courtesy. 40 Failure to consult with senators, particularly those from the president's
party, before selecting a nominee can have disastrous political repercussions.4 ' As
noted above, this norm emerged early, cowing President Washington into
42
withdrawing a nomination. President Hoover wanted to improve the quality of
the federal judiciary and thus attempted to impose new standards on candidates
28. Id. at 32 (quoting Letter from William Denman, J., 9th Cir., to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Pres., 208
U.S. District Judgeships 1933-1945 (Nov. 7, 1936)) (internal quotations omitted).
29. Id. at 38.
30. See Goldman, supra n. 11, at 166, 170.
31. Id. at 168.
32. See generally id. at 168-70.
33. Ross, supra n. 2, at 428-34.
34. Goldman, supra n. 11, at 160, 163.
35. Ross, supra n. 2, at 434.
36. Goldman, supra n. 11, at 198.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 207.
39. Id.
40. Gerhardt, supra n. 9, at 1702.
41. Gerhardt, supra n. 8, at 27-28.
42. See supra nn. 11-13 and accompanying text.
2004]
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for appointment. 43 The Senate, however, saw the President's plan as an intrusion
into senatorial prerogatives in identifying nominees, and eventually President
Hoover caved to political pressure.44 President Truman saw nominees from
Georgia, Illinois, and Iowa blackballed for his failure to consult with their home-
state senators. 5 President Kennedy was forced to break his promise not to
appoint segregationists to the bench when the Arkansas senators threatened to
hold up all of the President's nominees if their selection for an Eighth Circuit
appointment was not approved.46
In appointing members of my court, President Reagan encountered similar
problems with Republican Senator Bill Armstrong of Colorado. The President
attempted to appoint Steven Williams, then a professor at the University of
Colorado Law School, to a vacancy created when my Colorado colleague William
Doyle took senior status in 1984. He did so without consulting Senator
Armstrong, and the Senator made it very clear that if Mr. Williams were
nominated, the Senator would oppose him. The result was a stalemate. The
President finally acquiesced and withdrew Mr. Williams from consideration for
the Tenth Circuit, appointing him to the D.C. Circuit instead. The President then
requested a list of names of potential nominees from Senator Armstrong and
ultimately appointed David Ebel from that list in 1988. The process left my court
with a vacancy for four years.
When President Carter took office in 1977, he took issue with the political
patronage that resulted from senatorial preeminence in identifying judicial
candidates.47 His primary goal in judicial appointments was to diversify the
federal bench, and in order to do so, he had to wrench control over selection away
from the Senate. After intense negotiations with Senator James Eastland of
Mississippi, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, President Carter agreed to
leave primary control in identifying district court candidates with the Senate, but
he established merit selection commissions for nominees to the courts of appeals. 8
As mandated by an executive order establishing the commissions,49 the President
appointed selection panels for each circuit and required each panel to "include
members of both sexes, members of minority groups, and approximately equal
numbers of lawyers and nonlawyers."5° When the panels' initial nominations
included few women and minorities, President Carter issued a revised executive
43. See Goldman, supra n. 11, at 9.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 71-72, 75, 79-80.
46. Id. at 168.
47. See id. at 236.
48. Goldman, supra n. 11, at 238. There was a fair amount of dissension in the Senate. Democratic
Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas reportedly expressed the frustration of many of his colleagues in
complaining: "I am the merit commission for Texas." Id. at 260 (citing Charles R. Babcock, Picking
Federal Judges: Merit System vs. Pork Bench Wash. Post A4 (Nov. 7, 1978) for the quoted language and
Martin Tolchin, Carter Issues Guide for Naming Judges 128 N.Y. Times A18 (Nov. 9, 1978) for Sen.
Bentsen's report that he did not recall making the statement).
49. Exec. Or. 11972, 42 Fed. Reg. 9659 (Feb. 17,1977).
50. Id. at 9660; see Goldman, supra n. 11, at 238.
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order explicitly encouraging the panels "to make special efforts to seek out and
identify well qualified women and members of minority groups as potential
nominees."51
At the time, there were a total of 510 Article III federal judges.52 The
number of federal appeals had grown to almost 20,000 per year.53 This exploding
caseload resulted in the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978,54 which created 117 new
district court judgeships and thirty-five new positions on the circuit courts.
55
These positions presented President Carter with a unique "opportunity to place
women and minorities on the bench., 56 When the Attorney General's Office and
the Senate seemed insufficiently committed to affirmative action for these new
judgeships, the White House applied additional pressure."
The previous "excruciatingly slow pace of diversification of the federal
bench, 58 sped up dramatically with President Carter at the helm.59 When he left
office in 1981, he had appointed nearly forty percent of the federal judiciary and
placed unprecedented numbers of women and minorities in lifetime positions on
the bench.6° Prior to his administration, for example, only two women had ever
been appointed to a federal court of appeals, Florence Allen by President
Franklin Roosevelt to the Sixth Circuit and Shirley Hufstedler by President
Johnson to the Ninth Circuit.61 President Carter appointed eleven women to the
courts of appeals, 19.6 percent of his appeals court appointees.62
My own appointment illustrates both the political nature of the process and
President Carter's hands-on involvement. I was a beneficiary both of President
Carter's commitment to place more women on the federal courts and the
Omnibus Judgeship Act, which created an eighth position for the Tenth Circuit
that was designated an Oklahoma position by the President. Knowing President
Carter was affirmatively seeking female candidates, I applied in the fall of 1978 to
the nominating commission for the Tenth Circuit. The commission's eleven seats
were held by six lawyers and five lay people, several women and one minority, and
representatives from each of the six states comprising the Tenth Circuit. This
51. Exec. Or. 12059, 43 Fed. Reg. 20949, 20950 (May 16, 1978); see Goldman, supra n. 11, at 239.
52. See Admin. Off. of U.S. Cts., Table C: U.S. Courts of Appeals: Additional Judgeships Authorized
by Judgeship Acts <http://www.uscourts.gov/history/tablec.pdf> (accessed Mar. 10, 2004) [hereinafter
U.S. Cts., Table C]; Admin. Off. of U.S. Cts., Table H: U.S. District Courts: Additional Authorized
Judgeships <http://www.uscourts.gov/history/tableh.pdf> (accessed Mar. 10, 2004) [hereinafter U.S.
Cts., Table 11]. These charts indicate that there were 404 authorized district judgeships and 97
authorized courts of appeals judgeships in 1977. Adding the nine Supreme Court Justices brings the
total number to 510.
53. Dir. Admin. Off. of U.S. Cts., Management Statistics for the U.S. Courts 13 (Admin. Off. of U.S.
Cts. 1979).
54. Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978).
55. Goldman, supra n. 11, at 241-42.
56. Id. at 242.
57. Id. at 239-40, 248-49, 254, 257.
58. Id. at 3.
59. See id. at 238.
60. Goldman, supra n. 11, at 238.
61. See id. at 357.
62. Id. at tbl. 9.2, 356.
20041
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same commission had previously been charged with proposing nominees to the
Tenth Circuit from Kansas and Utah and had no women applicants for either of
those positions.
Unbeknownst to me at the time, my application did not enjoy smooth sailing
in the commission. I was later told the following story by a friend in Colorado
who had heard it from Josie Heath, a member of the commission from Colorado.
The story was subsequently confirmed to me by Ms. Heath herself. Unlike the
procedure used for the Kansas and Utah positions, at the initial meeting of the
group considering the Oklahoma position the chairman announced that the
commission would narrow the field by allowing each member to eliminate one
obviously unqualified candidate. He started by stating he was eliminating me.
Josie Heath, who was sitting halfway around the table from the chairman, was
dumbfounded; she thought my qualifications were quite good. When she asked
the chairman why he was eliminating me, he responded that I had four children
and obviously could not handle the job. Ms. Heath was so stunned she was
temporarily speechless. Fortunately for me, by the time the elimination process
got around to her, she had gathered her wits. Her choice for elimination was a
male justice on the Oklahoma Supreme Court, who, as it turned out, was the
chairman's favorite candidate. It was the chairman's turn to be stunned; he
asserted that this applicant was obviously highly qualified. Ms. Heath responded
that the applicant was clearly not qualified since he had five children. After a
discussion about the merits of eliminating applicants on the basis of the number of
their children, the commission members agreed it was not a proper basis for
disqualification and that both of us should remain under consideration.
I was one of a number of candidates invited for an interview with the
commission. When I arrived at the appointed time, I was given a number of
questions I was told I would have to answer and then placed in a room by myself
for half an hour to contemplate my responses. One question asked me to explain
what I had done to further the cause of justice. Another asked what I thought my
qualifications were for the position and what I would add to the court. After I
answered the general questions at the beginning of the interview, each member of
the commission was given an opportunity to question me. Among other things, I
63
was asked my opinion of Roe v. Wade. I was also asked how having four children
might impact my handling of the job. One of the female members of the
commission vociferously objected to what she viewed as an unlawful employment
question. Unaware of the history of the controversial question, I replied that,
knowing Congress was not covered by Title VII of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act,6 I assumed the judiciary was not covered either. I answered the
question.
The end result of the application process was that my name was one of four
forwarded to President Carter for his consideration, the others being Pat Irwin,
63. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
64. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
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the justice on the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Dale Cook, a sitting federal district
court judge who had been appointed by President Nixon, and Lee West, a former
state court trial judge and FAA commissioner who was by then practicing law in
Tulsa. I was thirty-nine years old at the time, practicing at Doerner, Stuart,
Saunders, Daniel & Anderson in Tulsa, and I faced formidable competition from
these gentlemen in terms of both legal and judicial experience. Needless to say,
the four of us lobbied hard for the position. I had no connections with either
senator from Oklahoma, but I did have a friend in Washington, D.C.-R. Dobie
Langenkamp, my former law partner and now a professor at this law school, who
had taken a job in the Carter administration in the Department of Energy. Dobie
helped me make some contacts in Washington, one of whom worked for Rosalyn
Carter in the White House. The women's groups in Washington were agitating for
women to be appointed, and they did their own lobbying. I was finally nominated.
I did not know until I was doing research for this paper that President Carter
was actively involved in my selection. Bob Lipshutz, one of the White House
staffers who advised the President on judicial appointments, was asked by the
President to write a memo regarding the proposed nominees so the President
65would be informed. With respect to the vacancy on the Tenth Circuit, Lipshutz's
memo listed my name "with the notation: '(white female)-private practice, first
female partner in a major Oklahoma firm; first woman to serve as an Oklahoma
Bar examiner; experience in complex litigation.' 66 The three other proposed
nominees were also described. The President indicated on the memo his interest
in me.6' The rest is history.
In focusing on affirmative action in its judicial appointments, the Carter
administration was, of course, making a political statement. And notwithstanding
the use of merit selection commissions, only 7.1 percent of President Carter's
circuit court appointees were Republican.68 When Attorney General Griffen Bell
was asked why a large percentage of those surviving this "merit" selection process
were Democrats, I recall him responding, "We're not running an affirmative
action program for Republicans."
When President Reagan took office, he abandoned the merit selection
61
commissions. He returned to the practice of previous presidents, relying on
people within the administration to propose and vet potential candidates. Like
Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan ran for office against the courts. In 1980, the
Republican Party platform included a promise:
We pledge.., the appointment of women and men.., whose judicial philosophy is
characterized by the highest regard for protecting the rights of law-abiding citizens,
and is consistent with the belief in the decentralization of the federal government
65. Goldman, supra n. 11, at 249.
66. Id. (quoting Memo. from Bob Lipshutz, White H. counsel, to Jimmy Carter, Pres., Judicial
Nominees (Apr. 7, 1979)) (footnote omitted).
67. Id.
68. Id. at tbl. 9.2, 355.
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and efforts to return decisionmaking power to state and local elected officials. We
will work for the appointment of judges at all levels of the judiciary who respect
traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life.
70
President Reagan "fram[ed] his appointment goals in terms of the judicial
philosophy he believed would accomplish his political purposes,, 71 and viewed
successful appointments as key to promoting his domestic policy agenda.
72
The Reagan administration took the appointment process very seriously.
Attorney General Edwin Meese hired a Department of Justice special assistant
whose sole and specific purpose was investigating the judicial philosophies of
prospective nominees.73 While the administration insisted it was not quizzing
candidates on how they would rule in specific cases, several nominees, especially
women, claimed they were asked how they would rule in potential cases
concerning abortion.74
President Reagan experienced some early problems in the Senate with
respect to confirmation of nominees perceived by Democrats as particularly
conservative.75 People for the American Way launched the first media campaign
against district and circuit judge nominees in 1985, preventing confirmation of
Jefferson Sessions III to a district judgeship in Alabama and nearly keeping
Daniel Manion off the Seventh Circuit.76 Senate Democrats initiated a filibuster
of then-Justice Rehnquist's elevation to Chief Justice, but Republicans quickly
overcame it to confirm him.77 Justice Scalia was confirmed without much noise.78
Then, in 1987, came the nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court. Judge
Bork's 1982 confirmation to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
had been relatively uneventful. 79  His background as a D.C. Circuit judge,
professor at Yale Law School, and solicitor general and acting attorney general
under President Nixon made him particularly suited by experience for the
Supreme Court nomination. His position as a "conservative intellectual leader" 80
made him attractive to President Reagan. The administration viewed Judge Bork
as the person who could turn the tide on the Supreme Court. However, Senate
Democrats and liberal interest groups saw the fate of Roe v. Wade in Judge Bork's
hands and launched an all-out war against his nomination.8 The result was a fifty-
70. Goldman, supra n. 11, at 296-97 (quoting 1980 Republican Platform Text, 38 Cong. Q. Wkly.
Rpt. 2030, 2046 (July 19, 1980)) (internal quotations and footnote omitted).
71. Id. at 297.
72. Id. at 2, 297-98.
73. Id. at 301-02.
74. See id. at 304-05 (citing a Justice Department official's recollection and an NPR report on such
questioning of female candidates).
75. Goldman, supra n. 11, at 308.
76. Id. at 308-13.
77. Id. at 316.
78. Id. at 316-17.
79. Id. at 316.
80. Goldman, supra n. 11, at 317.
81. Maltese, supra n. 1, at 8.
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eight to forty-two vote against confirmation. Such prolonged and virulent attacks
on presidential nominees have since become known as "borking.,
82
The Senate ultimately confirmed Judge Anthony Kennedy of the Ninth
Circuit to the Supreme Court position, and the saga came to a close. President
Reagan continued to face an increasingly active Democratic opposition, however,
and even saw conservative groups doom one nominee to the Eighth Circuit by
labeling her as a "strong feminist" and criticizing her "pro-abortion" stance
despite the fact she had never publicly taken a position on abortion issues.83 Still,
despite this turbulence, President Reagan's success in judicial appointments was
tremendous. Indeed, he believed the judiciary he appointed to be "his most
enduring legacy." 84
Though with far less fanfare than his predecessor, the first President Bush
continued President Reagan's efforts to "reshape constitutional law ' 85 with
appointments to the federal bench.86 The pledge to appoint pro-life judges
remained in the 1988 Republican platform, although then-Vice President Bush
87denied he would employ a "litmus test" if elected president.
President Clinton's focus in judicial appointments was on confirming diverse
and highly qualified candidates. 88 He was apparently less concerned with a
potential nominee's ideological bent.89 During his first campaign, he implied he
would only put forth nominees who expressed support for abortion rights but
retreated somewhat from this pledge once in office.9° Ultimately, with an
aggressive legislative agenda, and eventually impeachment proceedings to
confront, President Clinton did not want to waste political capital in the
appointment process. 9' To ward off potential Senate battles, President Clinton
engaged Republican Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah, Chair of the Judiciary
82. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Forgetfulness, Fuzziness, Functionality, Fairness, and Freedom in
Dispute Resolution: Serving Dispute Resolution through Adjudication, 3 Nev. L.J. 305, 340 (2002-2003)
(describing the coining of the phrase "borking").
83. Goldman, supra n. 11, at 318, 332 & n. ff.
84. Id. at 301.
85. Neal Devins, Congress and the Making of the Second Rehnquist Court, 47 St. Louis U. L.J. 773,
774 (2003).
86. Id.; see Ross, supra n. 2, at 446 (noting the relatively obscure role of judicial issues in the 1988
election).
87. Ross, supra n. 2, at 447.
88. Gerhardt, supra n. 8, at 36.
89. See Jonathan L. Entin, Judicial Selection and Political Culture, 30 Cap. U. L. Rev. 523, 545
(2002); Ross, supra n. 2, at 457 (describing the lack of ideologues among President Clinton's nominees
and quoting a political scientist's observation that "the main criticism of [Justice] Breyer was that he
had too many holdings in Lloyd's of London" (quoting Harvey Berkman & Claudia MacLachlan,
Don't Judge a Book. . ., Natl. L. Rev. Al (Oct. 21, 1996))); Carl Tobias, The Bush Administration and
Appeals Court Nominees, 10 Wm. & Mary Bill Rights J. 103, 106 (2001).
90. See Neal Devins, Through the Looking Glass: What Abortion Teaches Us about American
Politics, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 293, 304-05 (1994) (detailing President Clinton's pro-choice judicial
agenda); David Lauter, Clinton Calls for Tougher Gun Controls, L.A. Times A3 (Oct. 4, 1993) (noting
President Clinton's retreat on a pro-choice "litmus test").
91. Gerhardt, supra n. 8, at 33.
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Committee, in negotiations when the Senator assumed the chairmanship in 1995.'
This move was to the great benefit of the Tenth Circuit because it enabled us to
have four vacancies filled in relatively short order. The working relationship
between the President and Senator Hatch could not be sustained, however. The
conservative Judicial Selection Monitoring Project attacked a number of nominees
as elite left-wingers ready to "blaze[] an activist trail. 9 3 Majority Whip Tom
DeLay suggested impeaching "liberal" judges already appointed.94 A conservative
media blitz made it difficult for Republican senators to support the
administration's candidates, and they began to hold up nominations. 9 Senator
Hatch himself held up all of the administration's judicial nominations in order to
win a controversial appointment to the district bench favored by conservatives in
Utah.96 Senator James Inhofe of Oklahoma placed a hold on thirty judicial
nominees in anger over President Clinton's recess appointment of an openly gay
man as Ambassador to Luxembourg.97 When at the end of 1997 Chief Justice
Rehnquist issued a then-rare chastising of the Senate for its slow pace of
confirmations, Senator Hatch blamed President Clinton's nomination of "activist"
judges for the delay. 98 Notwithstanding the political rhetoric, however, I know
from my experience at the time as Chief Judge of the Tenth Circuit that Senator
Hatch did a great deal to help President Clinton get his nominees through the
Senate as long as it was feasible for him to do so.
When President Clinton left office, a strong Republican opposition,
inconsistent Democratic support, and the distractions of impeachment left him
with an unimpressive rate of appointment. Forty-two nominees remained
unconfirmed, most of whom never received a hearing, 99 and there were nearly 100
vacancies on the federal bench.]° At the same time, yearly appeals had grown to
over 50,000.101
With so many vacancies and several aging Supreme Court Justices, it is not
surprising that judicial issues became a prominent feature in the 2000 presidential
campaign. 1°' Sophisticated members of the public were aware that "the election
92. See Carl Tobias, Judicial Selection at the Clinton Administration's End, 19 L. & Ineq. 159, 169
(2001).
93. Maltese, supra n. 1, at 15.
94. Id. at 16.
95. Id.
96. Brannon P. Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation Process: Replacing "Despise and Resent"
with "Advice and Consent," 53 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2001).
97. Sarah Binder, The Senate as a Black Hole: Lessons Learned from the Judicial Appointment
Experience, 19 Brookings Rev. 37 (Spring 2001) (available at <http://www.brookings.edu/press/
REVIEW/spring2001lbinder.htm>); Maltese, supra n. 1, at 19.
98. Denning, supra n. 96, at 9-10.
99. Maltese, supra n. 1, at 21.
100. Gerhardt, supra n. 9, at 1701.
101. Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary: December 31, 2000, at 6 (Admin. Off. of U.S. Cts.
2000).
102. See Ross, supra n. 2, at 460 (arguing "[j]udicial issues were more prominent in the 2000 election
than in any election since 1968").
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could shift the balance of the [Supreme] Court."' °3 Nine days before the election,
in the battleground state of Michigan, Vice President Al Gore warned:
The Supreme Court is at stake. There are going to be three, maybe four ... maybe
even five justices ... appointed by the next president .... Think about civil rights.
Think about women's rights. Think about human rights. Think about antitrust law.
Think about Federalism. All of these issues are on the ballot .... '
Pro-life activist Gary Bauer predicted Governor George W. Bush's election
would lead to the overturning of Roe v. Wade,10 5 and many commentators believed
the election would have a significant effect on federalism and affirmative action.10
6
The awareness among presidents that courts could determine the success of their
domestic policy agendas was spreading to the public.
Under the second President Bush, judicial selection procedures underwent
immediate changes. President George W. Bush moved central command from the
attorney general's office to the White House.0 7 Citing a perceived bias in the
ABA, he cut the organization out of the screening process.' 8 In the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Senator Hatch dramatically altered the mysterious "blue
slip" procedure. At the time, either senator from a judicial candidate's home state
could withhold a "blue slip," or in essence, his or her approval, and block a
nomination. 0 9 Senator Hatch had allowed this Senate tradition to continue during
the Clinton administration, when Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina used it
to block all of President Clinton's nominees to the Fourth Circuit.10 But in 2001,
Senator Hatch announced that both senators from a state would have to withhold
a "blue slip" for a nomination to be blocked, essentially giving Republican
senators the ability to trump their Democratic colleague's disapproval.1" Having
lost the ability to block nominations by other means, Senate Democrats began
threatening to filibuster President Bush's nominees." 2  This step marked a
significant escalation in the confirmation wars. While moderate nominees have
received relatively easy confirmation, those perceived as too conservative now
face a stormy Senate." 3  For example, Miguel Estrada did not survive the
filibustering and finally withdrew as a nominee to the D.C. Circuit." 4 White
103. Id. at 461.
104. Id. at 461-62 (quoting Gore in His Own Words, N.Y. Times News Serv. (Oct. 30, 2000)) (internal
quotations and footnote omitted).
105. Id. at 463-64.
106. Id. at 464.
107. Gerhardt, supra n. 9, at 1697.
108. See Gerhardt, supra n. 8, at 25. Senator Hatch had ended the ABA's testimony at confirmation
hearings in 1997, but President Clinton continued to consult the organization and receive formal
ratings of potential nominees. Id.
109. Denning supra n. 12, at 84; Maltese, supra n. 1, at 21-22.
110. Denning, supra n. 12, at 83 n. 58.
111. Id. at 84; Maltese, supra n. 1, at 21-22, 26.
112. Denning, supra n. 12, at 84.
113. See Maltese, supra n. 1, at 26.
114. The Estrada nomination and President Clinton's nomination of Elena Kagan to the D.C. Circuit
make for interesting comparison. Both were nominated to the D.C. Circuit, but Mr. Estrada fell to a
filibuster, and Ms. Kagan never received a hearing, let alone a vote on the Senate floor. Mr. Estrada
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House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer criticized Senate Democrats' lack of
bipartisan spirit, but Democrats responded by reminding the White House that
judicial appointments had entailed political battles long before the current
administration took office.'
1 5
President Bush has chosen his nominees with politics in mind, and the
Senate has responded in kind. That the ideology of nominees matters to both the
president and the Senate is nothing new. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has aptly
summarized the situation:
I once saw it written that every generation believes that it is the first to really
discover sex. So, too, it seems that every generation has the sense that it is the first
to uncover that ideology has a role in the judicial selection process. This is
nonsense. Every President in American history, to a greater or lesser extent, has
chosen federal judges.., based on their ideology. Likewise, since the earliest days
of the nation, the United States Senate also has looked to ideology in the
confirmation process. This is exactly how it should be.
116
II. DANGEROUS DELAY
In my judgment, the breakdown in the judicial selection process comes not
so much from the political nature of the process, but from the inordinate delays
engendered in recent times by the divisive nature of Congress and the increasing
level of retaliation for prior wrongs allegedly done by the opposing party in
confirmation battles. Major vacancies on the courts of appeals are the result.
What President George W. Bush faces is not a Senate more focused on the
ideology of judicial nominees than prior Senates. Rather, he faces a Senate almost
evenly split between Republicans and Democrats and a public exceptionally
polarized politically. Divided government-the situation in which Congress and
the presidency are controlled by different parties-has been the norm since 1969.
earned his undergraduate degree from Columbia. Ms. Kagan earned hers from Princeton, and then
received a Masters in Philosophy from Oxford. Both graduated from Harvard Law School, where they
were both editors of the Harvard Law Review, and both proceeded into prestigious appellate
clerkships-Mr. Estrada for Judge Amalya Kearse on the Second Circuit, and Ms. Kagan with Judge
Abner Mikva on the D.C. Circuit. Mr. Estrada then clerked for Justice Kennedy on the United States
Supreme Court, Ms. Kagan for Justice Marshall. After clerking, Mr. Estrada worked for one year with
the New York law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, then joined the U.S. Attorney's Office in the
Southern District of New York. From 1992 to 1997, he worked as an assistant to the Solicitor General
of the United States. Mr. Estrada then became a partner in the Appellate and Constitutional Law
Practice Group of the D.C. office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. Following her clerkship with Justice
Marshall, Ms. Kagan joined the highly regarded D.C. litigation firm of Williams & Connolly. She then
took on law school faculty positions, teaching constitutional and administrative law, initially at the
University of Chicago and then at Harvard. In addition, she served as deputy director of the Domestic
Policy Council in the Clinton administration. Ms. Kagan is presently serving as Harvard Law School's
first female dean. Clearly, both Dean Kagan and Mr. Estrada were eminently qualified for the
positions for which they were nominated. Neither, however, managed to survive the judicial selection
process. For brief biographies of the two nominees, see U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal
Policy, Miguel A. Estrada: Biography <http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/estradabio.htm> (accessed Mar. 10,
2004) and Harvard Law School, Elena Kagan Named Next Dean of Harvard Law School <http://www.
law.harvard.edu/news/2003/04/03_kagan.php> (Apr. 3, 2003).
115. Maltese, supra n. 1, at 14.
116. Chemerinsky,supra n. 9, at 620.
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In half of those twenty-four years, the White House and the Senate have been in
opposite hands." 7 The electorate, moreover, has been growing increasingly
polarized, with less ticket-splitting and less of a moderate center.1 18 The House of
Representatives began to reflect this shift in the population after the 1982 mid-
term elections, but polarized politics did not truly take hold in the Senate until the
mid-1990s." 9 Now, however, the Senate appears even more polarized than the
House. 12  It is no coincidence, therefore, that "confirmation gridlock" began in
earnest in 1996.121 And the controversial 2000 election only increased party
unity.122 The hostile reception judicial nominees face in the Senate appears not to
represent a constitutional breakdown, but is instead a "byproduct" of the current
political climate.123 The problem for the administration of justice by the courts is
not the political nature of judicial selection, but a failure on the part of the Senate
to fill vacant positions expeditiously.
The delay in the judicial appointment process spawned by fierce political
battles has grown exponentially over the last decade. The average time from
nomination of a judicial candidate to final Senate action ballooned to 201 days in
1997, from a low of thirty-two days in President Reagan's first year in office. 124
The 1997 delay was particularly protracted for courts of appeals' nominees, who
languished an average of 258 days. 25 One of President Clinton's nominees to the
Sixth Circuit, Judge Helene White of the Michigan Court of Appeals, waited four
years without a hearing only to have her nomination die with the end of President
Clinton's time in office. 126 Her time in confirmation limbo surpassed that of any
judicial nominee in American history. 127 And the length of the vacancies on the
various courts of appeals were, in actuality, much longer than the time any
particular nominee waited in the Senate, given the delay from the time a judicial
seat becomes vacant to the time a nomination is made. For example, the seat
President Clinton nominated Judge White to fill was vacated on May 1, 1995,
when Judge Damon Keith took senior status.' 28 Nearly a decade later, the
position remains vacant.1
29
117. Maltese, supra n. 1, at 2.




122. See Maltese, supra n. 1, at 12 (noting that party unity was especially strong when George W.
Bush took office).
123. See id. at 11-12.
124. Uncertain Justice: Politics and America's Courts 46 (Century Found. Press 2000) [hereinafter
Uncertain Justice].
125. Id. at 50.
126. Carl Tobias, Sixth Circuit Federal Judicial Selection, 36 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 721, 742 (2003).
127. Id. at 722.
128. See Admin. Off. of U.S. Cts., Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, December 1, 1999
<http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/12011999/judgevacancy.htm> (accessed Mar. 10, 2004).
129. See Admin. Off. of U.S. Cts., Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, February 23, 2004 <http://www.
uscourts.gov/vacancies/judgevacancy.htm> (accessed Mar. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Vacancies in the
Federal Judiciary, Feb. 23, 2004].
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At the close of President Clinton's second term, more than one in nine slots
on the federal bench stood empty.130 Now, nearing the end of President George
W. Bush's first term, the vacancy rate is down to just over one in twenty.1 31
Certainly, these numbers indicate improvement. Nevertheless, the time between
nomination and confirmation remains substantial. Only fifty-four percent of
President Bush's nominees for existing vacancies have received hearings. While
a third of those nominees have been waiting less than ninety days for a hearing,
two-thirds have been waiting 180 days or more, and a third have been waiting
more than a year.13 3 Of those nominees who have received a hearing, only a
quarter have been reported out of the Judiciary Committee, and of those
favorably reported out, several have been waiting more than 180 days for a vote
on the Senate floor.
3 4
Some circuits have suffered more than others amid undue delay. The Sixth
Circuit has been hit particularly hard.35 President Clinton was unable to secure
confirmation for four vacancies on that court.136 Then, in the year he left office,
four Sixth Circuit Judges took senior status. The court-with sixteen approved
slots and two more recommended by the Judicial Conference of the United
States-had only eight judges at the start of the George W. Bush presidency. 137
While President Bush successfully appointed four judges to the Sixth Circuit,' 3' his
four additional nominees have been waiting more than a year for final Senate
action. 39 Michigan's Democratic senators are committed to blocking President
Bush's nominees from Michigan until he agrees to re-nominate President
Clinton's selections for the Sixth Circuit, whose consideration was blocked by the
Republican Senate. 40 This extended vacancy necessarily has taken its toll. That
court publishes fewer opinions than most circuits, takes longer to resolve the
matters before it, and relies more on visiting judges to complete its workload.14'
The stress of laboring at half capacity may also have hampered the court's
130. See Tobias, supra n. 89, at 108 (noting the number of vacancies at the time President Clinton left
office).
131. See U.S. Sen. Comm. on Jud., Nominations in the 108th Congress, Status of Article III Judicial
Nominations <http://senate.gov/judiciary/nominations.cfm> (Mar. 8, 2004) (noting eighteen vacancies
in courts of appeals and twenty-nine district court vacancies).
132. Compare Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, Feb. 23, 2004, supra n. 129 with Off. of Sen. Patrick
Leahy, Judicial Nominations Summary for the 108th Congress <http://leahy.senate.gov/issues/
nominations/cover.htm> (last updated Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Summary for the 108th Congress]
(providing names and dates for nominees receiving hearings).
133. Compare Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, Feb. 23, 2004, supra n. 129 with Summary for the
108th Congress, supra n. 132.
134. Compare Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, Feb. 23, 2004, supra n. 129 with Summary for the
108th Congress, supra n. 132.
135. Tobias, supra n. 126, at 722.
136. Id. at 742.
137. See id. at 723, 742-43.
138. See Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, Feb. 23, 2004, supra n. 129 (citing four current vacancies
on the Sixth Circuit).
139. See id.
140. Tobias, supra n. 126, at 722.
141. Id. at 743.
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collegiality, as betrayed by several non-legal disagreements aired in the form of
recent Sixth Circuit opinions.142
The Fourth Circuit has fared only slightly better in this time of increasing
confirmation wrangling. President Clinton sent the Senate nine nominations to
the Fourth Circuit in his two terms, but when he left office, five of the court's
fifteen positions were vacant.143 One seat had been open for over a decade, and
no judge from North Carolina sat on the court for eight years.144 The Fourth
Circuit now operates with thirteen judges, but it has experienced strain in these
years of vacant seats. The court publishes a lower percentage of its opinions than
any circuit but one and provides oral argument in a lower percentage of cases than
any other federal appellate court. 45
The D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit are viewed as particularly important
courts-the D.C. Circuit because of its exclusive jurisdiction in a variety of cases
and the Ninth Circuit because of the sheer number of people for whom it is,
essentially, the court of last resort. Likely because of their perceived significance,
however, each court has seen substantial nomination delay. From 1977 through
1998, it took a record-breaking average of 157 days for the Senate to take final
action on nominees to the Ninth Circuit.' 46 In 1997 and 1998, the average time was
an incredible 310 days.1 47 Judges Marsha Berzon and Richard Paez waited more
than two and four years respectively before being confirmed in 2000.148 The
position for which Judge Paez was ultimately confirmed had been vacant for a full
four years, Judge Berzon's for over three years.1 49 President Bush has been unable
to fill the two additional vacancies on that court, one of which was vacated in
September of 2000, the other in November of last year."O
One quarter of the D.C. Circuit is now vacant. President Clinton's
nominations of Elena Kagan and Allen Snyder were stalled in the Senate for
eighteen and fifteen months, respectively.' 51  Neither received a vote in the
Judiciary Committee, and Ms. Kagan never even received a hearing although she
142. See e.g. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) aff d, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Memphis
Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Sundquist, 184 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 1999) (denying petition for rehearing en
banc).
143. Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in the Fourth Circuit, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 2001, 2028 (2002).
144. See id. at 2003. President Bush has filled these lingering vacancies with Judge Roger Gregory of
Virginia in 2001 and Judge Allyson Duncan of North Carolina in 2003.
145. Id.
146. Uncertain Justice, supra n. 124, at 55.
147. Id.
148. Elliot M. Mincberg, Federal Judicial Nominations and Confirmations During the Last Two Years
of the Clinton Administration, in Rights at Risk: Equality in an Age of Terrorism, 21, 29 (Dianne M.
Piche et al. eds., Citizen's Commn. on Civ. Rights 2002) (available at http://www.cccr.org/chapter3.
pdf).
149. See Admin. Off. of U.S. Cts., Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, January 27, 1999
<http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/01271999/judgevacancy.htm> (accessed Mar. 11, 2004).
150. See Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, Feb. 23, 2004, supra n. 129 (noting two vacancies on the
Ninth Circuit, two nominees by President Bush, and Senate delay of over four months on each).
151. E.J. Dionne, Jr., They Started It, Wash. Post A27 (Feb. 21, 2003).
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was a highly qualified nominee. 52 Two of President Bush's nominees have been
waiting since July 2003 for a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee.'53 As
previously mentioned, his third nominee, D.C. attorney Miguel Estrada, withdrew
his name when it became clear a Democratic filibuster would doom his
nomination.
5 4
On my own court, the Tenth Circuit, four of my colleagues took senior status
in the period from October 1999 to January 2001. One position was vacant for
three and a half years, one was vacant for three years, and the other two were
vacant for eleven months each. All of the nominees were highly qualified people,
but two were quite controversial because of their perceived views on hot-button
issues. While their nominations languished, the work of our court piled up. And
the vast majority of our work has nothing to do with the issues that stalled my
colleagues' appointments. The delays were thus for perceived views that matter
naught to most of the cases we decide. Moreover, even if they did matter, both
nominees were eventually confirmed, so the delays were meaningless except to the
extent they contributed needlessly to the backlog of my circuit.
With the Democrats now filibustering circuit court nominees, President Bush
has upped the ante further by making appointments of filibustered nominees
under his recess appointment powers.'55 He has made two such appointments to
date: Judge Charles Pickering to the Fifth Circuit and William Pryor to the
Eleventh Circuit.56 If the Democrats keep filibustering and the President
continues to make recess appointments, the courts of appeals potentially could be
left with a series of one-year-term judges.
III. CONCLUSION
From my perspective as a member of the judiciary, the judicial appointment
process is quite broken. While the judiciary has cause to complain about it, as
Chief Justice Rehnquist has repeatedly done on our behalf, only the president and
the Senate have the power to fix the problem. I leave you with this thought: more
than 60,000 cases are now filed in the courts of appeals each year.5 7  The
increasing likelihood of long vacancy rates and the impact on the expeditious
handling of this enormous caseload looms large. When judges are appointed to
the federal courts, what principle of our democracy should we value the most-
152. Consult on Judges, Wash. Post A34 (Oct. 24, 2002); Jonathan Groner, Bush May Need to Show
Restraint in Judge Picks: Even Split in Senate, Modest Mandate Mean Conservative Court Nominees
May Face Confirmation Battles, 23 Leg. Times 9 (Nov. 13, 2000). For a discussion of Dean Kagan's
qualifications, see supra note 114.
153. See Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, Feb. 23, 2004, supra n. 129.
154. John Cornyn, Restoring Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process, 8 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 1, 4-5
(2003); Peter M. Shane, When Inter-Branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages, "Orderly
Shutdowns," Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial "Coups," 12 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Policy 503, 531-
32 (2003).
155. See Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary, Feb. 23, 2004, supra n. 129.
156. Id.
157. Off. of Judges Program, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics: March 31, 2003, at 7 (Admin. Off.
of U.S. Cts. 2003).
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the right of the president and the Senate to play politics as usual, or the
admonition that justice delayed is justice denied?
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